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Most psychological research on Bayesian
reasoning since the 1970s has used a
type of problem that tests a certain kind
of statistical reasoning performance. The
subject is given statistical facts within a
hypothetical scenario. Those facts include
a base-rate statistic and one or two diag-
nostic probabilities. The subject is meant
to use that information to arrive at a “pos-
terior” probability estimate. For instance,
in one well-known problem (Eddy, 1982)
the subject encounters the following:
The probability of breast cancer is 1%
for a woman at age forty who partici-
pates in routine screening. If a woman
has breast cancer, the probability is 80%
that she will get a positive mammogra-
phy. If a woman does not have breast
cancer, the probability is 9.6% that she
will also get a positive mammography. A
woman in this age group had a positive
mammography in a routine screening.
What is the probability that she actually
has breast cancer? __ %.
The information in such problems can
be mapped onto common expressions
that use H as the focal hypothesis, ¬H
as the mutually-exclusive hypothe-
sis, and D as datum: P(H), the prior
(often equated with the base-rate)
probability of the hypothesis; P(D|H),
the true-positive rate; and P(D|¬H), the
false-positive rate. In the mammogra-
phy problem, P(H) = 0.01, P(D|H) =
0.80, and P(D|¬H) = 0.096. Furthermore,
P(¬H) = 1 – P(H) = 0.99. The estimate
queried is P(H|D).
Bayes’ theorem states:
P(H|D) = P(H)P(D|H)
P(H)P(D|H) + P(¬H)P(D|¬H) .
Thus, it yields a posterior probability of
0.078 in the mammography problem. Yet
even the majority of physicians who were
queried by Eddy (1982) gave estimates
roughly one order of magnitude higher
(i.e., 0.70–0.80).
Well-established findings such as these
have supported the view that expert and
naïve subjects alike are non-Bayesian
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). A com-
mon explanation is that people neglect
base-rate information, which is not
tracked by the intuitive heuristics they
use to reach an estimate (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1972, 1973). For instance, if base
rates were neglected in the mammography
problem,
P (H|D) = 0.80
0.80 + 0.096 ≈ 0.89.
This estimate is closer to the modal esti-
mate but is still off by about ten percentage
points. Another explanation is that peo-
ple commit the inverse fallacy, confusing
P(H|D), which they are asked to estimate,
with P(D|H), which is provided (Koehler,
1996). In the mammography problem,
this explanation fits the data well because
P(D|H) = 0.80. The inverse fallacy can
also explain patterns of deviation from
Bayes’ theorem in tasks that hold con-
stant base rates for alternative hypotheses
(Villejoubert and Mandel, 2002).
It is also known that steps can be
taken to increase agreement with Bayes’
theorem. Since Bayes’ theorem can be
simplified as
P (H|D) = f (D ∩ H)
f (D)
,
task reformulations that directly pro-
vide these values or make them eas-
ily computable increase the proportion
of Bayesian responses (e.g., Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage et al.,
2002; Ayal and Beyth-Marom, 2014). Such
formulations of evidence reduce compu-
tational steps and may also effectively
trigger awareness of the correct solution,
much as eliciting logically-related prob-
ability estimates (e.g., of binary comple-
ments) in close proximity rather than far
apart improves adherence to the addi-
tivity property (Mandel, 2005; Karvetski
et al., 2013). Natural frequency represen-
tations, which reveal nested-set relations
among a reference class or representative
sample (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995;
Cosmides and Tooby, 1996), lend them-
selves easily to such simplification and
have been shown to improve Bayesian rea-
soning. For instance, Bayesian responses
to the mammography problem more
than doubled when it was presented in
natural-frequency format (Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995). Although the theoretical
bases of such improvements are debated
(e.g., Barbey and Sloman, 2007, and con-
tinuing commentaries), most agree that
substantial improvement in conformity
to Bayes’ theorem is achievable in this
manner.
Bayesian reasoning also benefits from
the use of visual representations of perti-
nent statistical information, such as Euler
circles (Sloman et al., 2003) and frequency
grids or trees (Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer,
2001), which further clarify nested-set
relations. For instance, Figure 1 shows
how the natural-frequency version of the
mammography problem could be rep-
resented with a frequency tree to help
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FIGURE 1 | Frequency tree and solution for the mammography problem.
individuals visualize the nested-set rela-
tions and how such information ought
to be used to compute the posterior
probability.
OBSERVATIONS
A remarkable feature of the standard
approach to studying Bayesian reasoning
is its inability to reveal how people revise
their beliefs or subjective probabilities in
light of newly acquired evidence. That is,
in tasks such as the mammography prob-
lem, information acquisition is not staged
across time (real or hypothetical), and
researchers typically do not collect multi-
ple “prior” and “posterior” (i.e., revised)
probability assessments.
It is instead conveniently assumed that
the base rate represents the subject’s prior
belief, P(H), which the subject updates in
light of “new” evidence, D. It is somewhat
ironic that advocates of base-rate neglect
have not noted (let alone warned) that, if
people ignore base rates, it may be unwise
to assume they represent the subject’s prior
probability. Would that not imply that the
subject ignores his or her own prior prob-
ability?
Priors need not equal base rates, as
many have noted (e.g., de Finetti, 1964;
Niiniluoto, 1981; Levi, 1983; Cosmides
and Tooby, 1996). The prior, P(H), is in
fact a conditional probability correspond-
ing to one’s personal probability of H,
given all that they know prior to learningD
(Edwards et al., 1963; de Finetti, 1972). In
all real-life cases where no single, relevant
base rate is ever explicitly provided, people
may experience considerable uncertainty
and difficulty in deciding precisely which
base rate is the most relevant one to con-
sider. For instance, imagine that the test
result in the mammography problem is
for a specific, real woman and not just an
abstract one lacking in other characteris-
tics. If her prior for H is contingent on
the presence or absence of some of those
characteristics, one could see how the base
rate provided in the problem might be
more or less relevant to the woman’s par-
ticular case. If she has several character-
istics known to elevate a woman’s risk of
breast cancer, then simply using the base
rate for 40-year-old women as her prior
would bias her revised assessment by lead-
ing her to underestimate the risk she faces.
Conversely, she may have a configuration
of characteristics that make her less likely
than the average 40-year-old woman to
develop breast cancer, in which case using
the base rate as her prior would cause her
to overestimate objective risk.
Clearly, the ideal base rate in such per-
sonal cases would be a sample of people
who are just like the patient, yet since
each of us is unique no such sample
exists. In the absence of a single, ideal base
rate, one must decide among a range of
imperfect ones—a task involving decision
under uncertainty. It might be sensible for
the woman getting the screening to anchor
on a relevant, available base rate, such as
for women in her cohort, and then adjust
it in light of other diagnostic characteris-
tics that she knows she possesses. Yet, if
people are overly optimistic (Taylor and
Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1989), we might
anticipate systematic biases in adjustment,
with underweighting of predisposing fac-
tors and overweighting of mitigating fac-
tors. This point about the possible role
of motivated cognition also brings a key
tenet of subjective Bayesianism to the
fore—namely, that different individuals
with access to the same information could
have different degrees of belief in a given
hypothesis, and they may be equally good
Bayesians as long as they are equally
respectful of static and dynamic coher-
ence requirements (Baratgin and Politzer,
2006).
Given that standard Bayesian reason-
ing tasks involve no assessment of a prior
probability, they should be seen for what
they are: conditional probability judgment
tasks that require the combination of sta-
tistical information. When that informa-
tion is fleshed out, it reveals the fours cells
of a 2 × 2 contingency table, where a =
f (H ∩ D), b = f (H ∩ ¬D), c = f (¬H ∩
D), and d = f (¬H ∩ ¬D). Going from left
to right, the four boxes in the lowest level
of the frequency tree in Figure 1 corre-
spond to cells a–d, which have received
much attention in the causal induction lit-
erature (Mandel and Lehman, 1998). We
can restate Bayes’ theorem as the following
cell-frequency equalities, corresponding to
short and long expressions given earlier,
respectively:
P (H|D) = a
a + c
=
(a + b) / (a + b + c + d)×
a/(a + b)
(a + b) / (a + b + c + d)×
a/(a + b) + (c + d) / (a + b + c + d)
×c/ (c + d)
.
From this perspective, it is perhaps unsur-
prising why a greater proportion of sub-
jects conform to Bayes theorem when they
are given the frequencies a–d than when
they are instead given the values equal
to (a + b)/(a + b + c + d), a/(a + b), and
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c/(c + d). That is, frequencies a–c sup-
port the easy computation of a/(a + c).
However, those improvements in perfor-
mance, which pertain to static coherence
constraints (Baratgin and Politzer, 2006),
do not speak to other important facets
of Bayesian reasoning, such adherence to
dynamic coherence constraints, which are
fundamental to Bayesian belief revision
(Seidenfeld, 1979).
I do not intend for my observations
to imply that the well-established find-
ings I summarized earlier are incorrect.
However, I believe greater care should be
taken in labeling the type of performance
measured in such experiments. “Statistical
inference” would seem to be more appro-
priate than “Bayesian reasoning” given the
limitations I have noted.
Future research on Bayesian reasoning
would benefit from a richer conceptualiza-
tion of what it is to “be Bayesian” and from
better discussion of whether being non-
Bayesian is necessarily irrational (Lewis,
1976; Walliser and Zwirn, 2002; Baratgin
and Politzer, 2006). Future work would
also benefit by breaking free of the typical
methodological approach exemplified by
the mammography problem. One avenue
would be to collect prior and poste-
rior assessments from subjects in exper-
iments where information acquisition is
staged (e.g., Girotto and Gonzalez, 2008),
or where temporal staging is at least an
important characteristic of the described
problem, such as in the Monty Hall prob-
lem (Krauss andWang, 2003) and Sleeping
Beauty problem (Elga, 2000; Lewis, 2001).
Another promising line involves assessing
people’s prior distributions for different
types of real events (e.g., Griffiths and
Tennenbaum, 2006).
The staging of information with
repeated assessments was in fact a com-
monmethodological approach in Bayesian
research prior to the 1970s, culminating
in the classic work on conservatism by
Ward Edwards and others (for a review,
see Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). Such
approaches could be revisited in new
forms and contrasted with other methods
of information staging, such as the trial-
by-trial information acquisition designs
used in causal induction (e.g., Kao and
Wasserman, 1993; Mandel and Vartanian,
2009) or category learning (e.g., Gluck and
Bower, 1988; Shanks, 1990) studies.
For example, Williams and Mandel
(2007) presented subjects with 28
problems prompting them for a con-
ditional probability judgment. In each
problem, subjects first saw 20 patient
results presented serially. The subject
saw whether the patient carried a virus
hypothesized to cause a particular illness
and whether the patient had the illness or
not. Sample characteristics were varied so
that P(H|D) ranged from 0 to 1 over seven
probability levels across the problems.
Subjects exhibited a form of conservatism
(cf. Edwards, 1968), overestimating low
probabilities and underestimating high
probabilities. The task illustrates the value
of breaking free of the standard problem
set. First, the trial-by-trial design better
represents the information acquisition
environment that ecological rationality
theorists (e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage,
1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996), have
described as natural. That is, information
acquisition in that task is more natural
than in natural-frequency versions of
standard problems because no statistical
information is presented to the subject in
written form. Rather, subjects learn about
each case serially, more like they would
have in the Paleolithic Era. Second, the
design gets researchers away from studying
average responses to a single problem with
a unique data configuration. The authors
would not have been able to detect conser-
vatism if they had not explored problems
for which the mathematical probabilities
subjects were asked to judge covered the
full probability range. Third, the induction
paradigm, which presents information on
cells a–d to subjects, easily lends itself to
studying subjective cell importance, which
can help take the cognitive processes sub-
jects use to arrive at their judgments out
of the proverbial black box. For instance,
Williams and Mandel (2007) found that,
when asked to assign subjective impor-
tance ratings to each of the fours cells,
subjects assigned weight to irrelevant
information, such as focusing on ¬D cases
when asked to judge P(H|D), causing an
underweighting of relevant information.
The issues I have raised, non-exhaustive
as they are, draw attention to some
important problems with the conventional
approach to studying Bayesian reason-
ing in psychology that has been domi-
nant since the 1970s. Rather than fostering
pessimism, I hope my comments illus-
trate that there are good opportunities for
future work to advance our understand-
ing of how people revise or update their
beliefs.
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